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NATIVE AMERICAN FREE PASSAGE RIGHTS 
UNDER THE 1794 JAY TREATY: SURVIVAL 
UNDER UNITED STATES STATUTORY LAW 
AND CANADIAN COMMON LAW 
BRYAN NICKELS* 
Abstract: Since 1794, Native American groups in both the United States 
(U.S.) and Canada have enjoyed the right of "free passage" across the 
U.S.-Canadian border per the provisions of the Jay Treaty. However, 
development and recognition of this right have taken decidedly 
different courses: while the U.S. has treated the right very liberally 
under statutory codification, the Canadian government has opted to 
develop, and restrict, the right under their courts' common law. This 
Note discusses the origin and development of the "free passage" right 
under the Jay Treaty, and encourages both the continued recognition of 
the right, as well as a stronger Canadian common law effort to 
harmonize treatment of the right with U.S. jurisprudence. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1794, following the American Revolution, the United States 
and Great Britain signed an agreement entitled the Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce, and Navigation (the Jay Treaty).l In addition to post-war 
normalization of relations between the two countries, the treaty also 
extended and acknowledged various rights of Amerind tribal groups 
occupying areas on or near the U.S.-Canadian border.2 Most 
significantly, the treaty stated that Indians on either side of the border 
would retain the right to move freely back and forth across the bor-
der, the so-called "free passage" right. 3 
* Bryan Nickels is a Notes & Comments Editor for the Boston College Intema/jonal and 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannick Majesty;-and 
the United States of America, By Their President, with the Advice and Consent of Their 
Senate, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K, T.S. No. 105 [hereinafter Jay Treaty). 
2 [d. art. 3; for the language of the treaty, see infin note 20 and accompanying text. 
3 Jay Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. Article 3 of the Jay Treaty also allows Indians to trans-
port "their own proper goods" without imposition of U.S. or Canadian duties. See id. 
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This 200 year-old provision has endured in both U.S. and Cana-
dian law, albeit in different forms.4 In the U.S., the Jay Treaty provi-
sions were incorporated into Section 289 of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA): "Nothing in this title shall be construed to 
affect the right of American Indians born in Canada to pass the bor-
ders of the United States, but such right shall extend only to persons 
who possess at least 50 per centum of blood of the American Indian 
race."5 Though the American statute is ripe with vagaries that poten-
tially create many areas of dispute, there have been relatively few judi-
cial disputes in U.S. courts over the years that might have led to a nar-
row construction of the statute.6 Instead, Section 289 has been treated 
with some of the broadest language given to any of the U.S. immigra-
tion laws, with courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
treating Section 289 in a way generally beneficial to native groups.7 
Additionally, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) also pro-
vides for permanent residency for Canadian Indians simply based on 
their eligibility for the Section 289 exemption: 
"[a]ny American Indian born in Canada who at the time of 
entry was entitled to the exemption provided ... by ... sec-
tion 289 of the Act, and has maintained residence in the 
United States since his entry, shall be regarded as having 
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence."8 
The Canadian government, in contrast, never truly incorporated 
the Jay Treaty into permanent statutory law.9 Instead, Canadian courts 
have been sustaining the Jay Treaty provisions through common law 
treatment, typically under the "aboriginal rights" doctrine,l° While 
4 Compare infra notes 31-95 and accompanying text (U.S. treatment) luith infra notes 
110-159 and accompanying text (Canadian treatment). 
5 Section 289 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1359 (1999). The current version of this law is little-changed from its original wording in 
U.S. law. United States ex reI. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp.660, 661 (W.D.N.¥. 1947) 
(citing the original language of 8 U.S.C. § 226a: 'This chapter shall not be construed to 
apply to tile right of American Indians born in Canada to pass me borders of me United 
States; Provided, That this right shall not extend to persons whose membership in Indian 
tribes or families is created by adoption "). 
6 See infra notes 31-95 and accompanying text. These cases represent almost the entire 
body of U.S. legal treatment of Section 289. See itt. 
7 See infra notes 31-95 and accompanying text; see also Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. 
Supp. 1210, 1220-21 (D. Maine, 1974). 
88 C.F.R. § 289.2 (1999). 
9 Regina v. Vincent, 11 T.T.R. 210 (Ont. Ct. App. 1993), available at 1993 TTR LEXIS 7, 
at *24. 
10 See infra notes 110-159 and accompanying text. 
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this seems to offer more liberal avenues to preserve the right, Cana-
dian courts have been restrictive in identifYing "aboriginal rights. "11 
In the last ten years especially, there have been decisions from 
Canadian courts that appear to undermine, if not threaten to com-
pletely eliminate, the free passage rights of Indians guaranteed under 
the Jay Treaty.12 With U.S. law establishing a liberal treatment of the 
Jay Treaty free passage provision,13 the recent Canadian treatment has 
resulted in a potentially significant disparity in the free passage right: 
in the U.S., a Canadian Indian cannot be deported, not even for pos-
session of heroin. 14 However, to claim the free passage right in Can-
ada, a U.S. Indian has to demonstrate a cultural or historical "nexus" 
to the specific area in Canada he wishes to visit,15 In fact, this "nexus" 
test even has been applied to Canadian Indians reentering Canada, 
disallowing Jay Treaty privileges where a Canadian Indian did not 
cross in an area his tribal group did not historically transverse,16 Fur-
ther restriction, or complete elimination, of the Jay Treaty free pas-
sage right by the Canadian courts could result in nothing less than 
chaos for those native groups straddling the U.S.-Canadian border, 
such as the Okanogan/Colville group,l7 as well as for any individual 
member of a native tribe seeking to exercise his free passage right. 
Part I of this Note explores the background of the free passage 
right of North American Indians under the Jay Treaty and the subse-
quent Treaty of Ghent. Part II examines case law addressing Section 
289, both from U.S. federal courts and the BIA. Additionally, Part II 
discusses Canadian common law treatment of the Jay Treaty free pas-
sage right,lS as well as related Canadian statutes and regulations. Part 
Jl National Minister of Revenue v. Mitchell, 1998 Fed. Ct. Appeal LEXIS 345, at *9 
(Fed. Ct. App. 1998). 
12 Jd.; Watt v. Liebelt, 65 C.R.R.2d 191 (Fed. Ct. App. 1998), available at 1998 CRR 
LEXIS 458, at *26-27; Vincent, 1993 T.T.R. LEXIS 7, at *30. 
13 See infra notes 31-95 and accompanying text. 
14 Matter of Yellow quill, 16 I. & N. Dec. 576, 576-77 (BIA 1978). 
15 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *26-27. 
16 Mitc1lRll, 1998 Fed. Ct. Appeal LEXIS 345, at *22. 
Ii Sharon O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies and 
Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 315, 323 (1984). 
18 It is important to note that the consensus of U.S. and Canadian courts is that the Jay 
Treaty is not cunently in effect. Karnuth v. United States ex reI. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 237 
(1929) [hereinafter Albm] (held that the Jay Treaty was abrogated by the War of 1812); 
Francis v. The Queen, 4 D.L.R. 760 (Ct. Ex. 1954), available at 1954 DLR LEXIS 767, at 
*12-17 [hereinafter Francis 1], affirmed by Francis v. The Queen, 3 D.L.R.2d 641, 642 (Sup. 
Ct. Can. 1956), available at 1956 DLR LEXIS 1735 [hereinafter Francis II] (held the Jay 
Treaty, as a non-self-executing treaty, was never put into effect by permanent legislation). 
Thus, no Jay Treaty free passage right" actually exists. See id. However, for the purpose of 
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III draws conclusions from American and Canadian law, discussing 
the reasons for the survival of the free passage rights, and a brief dis-
cussion of similar non-treaty based rights granted to native groups in 
other areas of North America. This Note concludes with a brief dis-
cussion of the implications to U.S. and Canadian immigration, given 
the ongoing survival of free passage rights, both in Section 289 and in 
the Canadian common law. The conclusion of this Note recommends 
solutions towards a "harmonizing" of U.S. and Canadian law to avoid 
disparate treatment of natives crossing the border, as well as further 
Canadian recognition and protection of the Jay Treaty free passage 
right. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF 289: THE JAY TREATY AND THE TREATY OF GHENT 
A. The Jay Treaty 
Following the conclusion of the American Revolutionary War, 
Indian nations, including the Six Nations (the Iroquois), were bi-
sected by the newly-established U.S.-Canadian border, a seeming in-
trusion by the governments into lands that remained the territory of 
the tribes.19 Thus, Great Britain and the United States added the fol-
lowing provision to the Jay Treaty: 
It is agreed that it shall at all times be free ... to the Indians 
dwelling on either side of the said boundary line, freely to 
pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respec-
tive territories and countries of the two parties, on the con-
tinent of America ... and freely to carryon trade and com-
merce with each other .... [N]or shall the Indians passing or 
repassing with their own proper goods and effect of what-
ever nature, pay for the same any impost or duty whatever. 
But goods in bales, or other large packages, unusual among 
Indians, shall not be considered as goods belonging bona 
fide to Indians.20 
this Note, this right, as initially recognized by the Jay Treaty, will be referred to as the :Jay 
Treaty free passage right" even though the actual right survives only in U.S. statute and 
Canadian common law. See infra notes 31-95, 110-159 and accompanying text. 
19 McCandless v. United States ex reI. Diablo, 25 F.2d 71,71-72 (3d Cir. 1928) [herein-
after Diablo Il] . 
20 Jay Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. 
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An Explanatory Article in 1796 later affirmed this passage within the 
Jay Treaty.21 
B. The Treaty of Ghent 
The War of 1812 subsequently broke out between the U.S. and 
Great Britain. At the close of the war, Great Britain pushed for the 
recognition of the Indian nations as full sovereigns, so as to create a 
"buffer zone" between the United States and Canada to prevent a pos-
sible U.S. invasion.22 The U.S. declined, compromising in a restora-
tion of the agreements under the Jay Treaty: 
The United States of America engage ... to restore to such 
tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights, and 
privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to 
in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such 
hostilities ... And His Britannic majesty engages ... to re-
store to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the posses-
sions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or 
been entitled, to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, 
previous to such hostilities.23 
II. A SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. AND CANADIAN CASES 
Despite the almost draconian relationship the United States had 
with Indian tribes, the Jay Treaty free passage right has persisted and 
survived.24 Prior to 1924, despite the developing antagonism to aliens 
in U.S. immigration laws,25 Canadian Indians were allowed to travel 
into the U.S., without being subjected to alien registration laws.26 
However, passage of the Immigration Act and Citizenship Act in 1924 
by the U.S. Congress led to the exclusion of Canadian Indians, as Ca-
nadian Indians not eligible for U.S. citizenship were thereby exclud-
21 Explanatory Article of the Third Article of the Jay Treaty, May 4, 1796, U.S.-U.K., 8 
Stat. 130, T.S. No.1 06 [hereinafter Explanatory Article J. 
22 O'Brien, supra note 17, at 319. 
23 Treaty of Peace and Amity, art. 9, Dec. 24, 1814, U.S.-U.K., T.S. No. 109 [hereinafter 
Treaty of GhentJ. 
24 See Matter of Yellowquill, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 578. 
25 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 19-21 
(1997). 
26 Megan S. Austin, A Culture Divided by the United States-Mexico Border: The Tohono 
O'Odham Claim for Border Crossing Rights, 8 ARIZ.]. OF INT'L & CaMP. L. 97,103 (1991). 
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able as immigrants.27 The 1927 Diablo v. McCandless decision was per-
haps the first interpretive case in the U.S. discussing the Jay Treaty 
free passage right, some 130 years after the signing of the Jay Treaty.28 
Similarly, Canadian courts did not address free passage rights under 
the Jay Treaty until 1954.29 The reasons for such late consideration of 
the free passage right in both countries was discussed by Justice Suth-
erland in the U.S. Supreme Court's review of Karnuth v. United States 
ex reI. Albro: 
It is true, as respondents assert, that citizens and subjects of 
the two countries continued after the War of 1812, as before, 
freely to pass and repass the international boundary line. 
And so they would have done if there never had been a 
treaty on the subject. Until a very recent period, the policy of 
the United States, with certain definitely specified excep-
tions, had been to open its doors to all comers without re-
gard to their allegiance. This policy sufficiently accounts for 
the acquiescence of the Government in the continued exer-
cise of the crossing privilege upon the part of the inhabitants 
of Canada, with whom we have always been upon the most 
friendly terms .... 30 
A. U.S. Treatment 
1. Federal Court Decisions 
The first U.S. federal court case addressing the possibility of ab-
rogation of the Jay and Ghent treaties (and, accordingly, the free pas-
sage right) by the 1924 immigration acts was Diablo v. McCandless. 31 
27 O'Brien, supra note 17, at 326. 
28 United States ex reI. Diablo v. McCandless, 18 F.2d 282 (E.D. Penn., 1927) [herein-
after Diablo 1] . 
29 Francis I, 1954 DLR LEXIS 767, at *3 (noting that "ltlhis is a test case"). 
30 Albro, 279 U.S. at 242. However, it should be noted that the Albro opinion, significant 
in that it is the only Supreme Court opinion addressing free passage under the Jay Treaty, 
does not discuss the Indian free passage right, as neither respondent in the case was an 
"American Indian born in Canada," but rather a Scot and an Italian. Id. at 233-34. Al-
though the Albro Court rejected the interpretation of "permanent" in the Jay Treaty as 
meaning "perpetual," at least one court has ventured the argument that the Indians' rights 
under the Jay Treaty (specifically, the Six Nations) were not abrogated by the War of 1812 
because the Indians remained neutral throughout the affair. Thus, war-induced abrogation 
of the Jay Treaty only affected the rights of Canadians and Americans. Diablo II, 25 F.2d at 
72; see Albro, 279 U.S. at 242. 
31 Diablo I, 18 F.2d 282. 
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This district court opinion is brief, not even addressing the specifics of 
the case at hand.32 Instead, the court addressed the traditional rela-
tionship between Indian tribes and the U.S. government: as the court 
calls the unique relationship, "imperium in imperio" (roughly, "sover-
eign within a sovereign").33 The court also bluntly stated that the 
"boundary line to establish the respective territory of the United 
States and of Great Britain was clearly not intended to, and just as 
clearly did not, affect the Indians. "34 
The court also made the following bold statement regarding the 
possibility of the Jay Treaty being fully abrogated by the War of 1812: 
"We do not see that the rights of the Indians are in any way affected 
by the treaty, whether now existent or not,"35 suggesting an "aborigi-
nal rights" approach to Indian migratory rights.36 However, the court 
restricted this approach, acknowledging that Congress could exercise 
its power to exclude Canadian Indians.37 Regarding the 1924 Act, 
Congress did not express "the clear intention" to make the alien regis-
tration law applicable to Canadian Indians.38 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower 
court, stating that "[the Jay Treaty's free passage right for Indians] was 
not a temporary stipulation as to trade, commerce, mutual rights, and 
the like, but was in nature of a modus vivendi, to be thereafter ob-
served in the future by Canada and the United States in reference to 
the Indians. "39 The court ultimately found that the Jay Treaty was still 
in force.40 
One of the pinnacle cases in the examination of Section 289, as 
well as in the general study of Indian law, is Goodwin v. Karnuth.41 One 
of the most important facets of this case is the application of the 
definition of "Indian" to the treatment of immigration law.42 In this 




36 Diablo I, 18 F.2d at 283. 
37Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Diablo II, 25 F.2d at 72. 
40 Id. at 73. The Third Circuit still holds this opinion. Lazore v. Commissioner, 11 F.3d 
1180,1186 (3rdCir. 1993). 
41 United States ex reI. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp.660, 660 (W.D. N.Y 1947). 
The holding of Goodwin, that a Canadian Indian woman did not lose her status as an In-
dian for purposes of the Jay Treaty simply by marrying a white man, was the basis for the 
subsequent BIA decision of In theMatterofB-, 31. & N. Dec. 191, 192 (BIA 1948). 
42 See Goodwin, 74 F. Supp. at 661. 
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case, a Cayuga tribal member attempted to enter the United States 
without a visa and passport, giving false and misleading statements, 
and thereby entering without inspection.43 However, because she 
married a white man, under Canadian law, she endangered her status 
as an Indian; thus, the question turned on whether "Indian" is a po-
litical term or a racial one.44 The court reviewed several cases indi-
rectly speaking to the question, as well as looked to federal statutes.45 
The court also considered the canon of statutory interpretation, as 
expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court, that popular connotations of 
words and concepts should be incorporated in the analysis of statu-
tory wording.46 Thus, "[a]dopting this rule of construction, the words 
'American Indians born in Canada,' found in 8 U.S.C.A. [sec.] 226a 
must be given a racial connotation. "47 The court further ruled that 
the marriage did not disenfranchise the Indian woman, so further 
application of Canadian law was unnecessary.48 
In addition to the right of passage, the Jay Treaty also encom-
passes certain rights regarding the passage of Indian goods across the 
border.49 These rights, in addition to the issue of whether Canadian 
Indians were exempt from post-entry registration, were considered in 
the Akins v. Saxbe decision.5o In Saxbe, members of the Six Nations in 
Maine and New Brunswick challenged these questions of passage of 
goods and post-entry registration, citing the Jay Treaty.51 While the 
court ultimately dismissed the customs claims for lack of jurisdiction,52 
it did discuss the post-entry registration requirement extensively.53 
The post-entry registration requirement mandated that Canadian In-
dians register when their stays within the U.S. were to exceed thirty 
days.54 At issue, then, was whether the expression of a right "to pass" 
43 Id. at 660. 
44 [d. at 663. 
45Id. at 661-62. 
46 [d. at 662-63. 
47 Goodwin, 74 F. Supp. at 663. 
48 [d. 
49 Jay Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. While much scholady debate ensues about whether 
the Jay Treaty was fully abrogated by the War of 1812, and whether the Treaty of Ghent 
restored the original Jay Treaty provisions, courts have generally treated the passage of 
goods section as abrogated. Id.; see Alum, 279 U.S. at 239. 
50 Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. at 1212. 
51 [d. 
52 [d. at 1218. 
53 [d. at 1218-21. 
54 [d. at 1219. These requirements include registration, fingerprinting, and 
notification of address and address changes; the statute made it a criminal offense for fail-
ure to comply. [d. at 1214 nn.I-2. 
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also encompassed the right "to remain. "55 The court looked to the 
intent of the statute and the Jay Treaty (to exempt Indians from im-
migration statutes and requirements) and also employed two canons 
of statutory construction relating to Indians: first, that statutes and 
treaties must be construed as the Indians, at the time of passage, 
would have reasonably construed the agreement; and second, that 
ambiguities in treaties and statutes relating to Indians must be re-
solved in favor of the Indians.56 The court thus found that: 
the intent of Congress in enacting Section 1359 was to pre-
serve the aboriginal right of American Indians to move 
freely throughout the territories originally occupied by them 
on either side of the American and Canadian border, and, 
thus, to exempt Canadian-born Indians from all immigration 
restrictions imposed on aliens by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.57 
2. Administrative Decisions 
One of the first opportunities the BIA had to address Section 289 
(then Section 226a) was In the Matter of S---.58 There, the BIA ad-
dressed the question of the status of a white woman who married a 
Canadian Indian; under Canadian law, the woman was granted status 
as an Indian.59 The BIA thoroughly examined the most recent treat-
ments of the question of Canadian-Indian status, and acknowledged 
that there was little consensus on whether the identity had been based 
on a political or an ethnological concept of "Indian. "60 
55 Akinsv. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (D. Maine, 1974). 
56 [d. at 1220-21. It must be noted that the court was apparently in error in emmciat-
ing that the canon asserting construction of treaties in favor of how Indians at tlle time 
would have understood the treaty also is applicable to the construction of statutes relating 
to Indians. [d. at 1221. The premise of this canon rests on the superior bargaining power 
of the U.S. over negotiating tribes, as well as the United States' advantage in usage of treaty 
language; as statutes are not bilateral transactions, extension of this canon seems illogical. 
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 222 nn.42-43, 224 n.60 and accom-
panying text (Rennard Strickland ed., Michie: Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1982) (1942). 
57 Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. at 1219. 
58 In the Matter of 5-, 11. & N. Dec. 309 (BIA 1942). 
59 [d. at 310. Specifically, the Canadian statute in question established Indian status 
recognition to: "(i) Any male person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular 
band; (ii) Any child of such person; (iii) Any woman who is or was lawfully married to such 
person." [d. 
60 [d. at 310-11. 
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In Matter of S-, the BIA opted for a very liberal conceptualiza-
tion of the purpose of the statute: "to preserve to [Canadian Indians] 
their ancient tribal rights. "61 In this, "Indians by blood were [not] the 
only ones intended to benefit[; instead,] tribal membership under the 
adequate guide of the Canadian Indian Act controls. "62 Presented 
with the possible inconsistency in Canadian laws where an Indian 
woman would lose passage rights were she to marry a white man, the 
BIA held that this result still would be an appropriate determination 
under the Canadian Indian Act definitions and would create no 
harm.63 Although the BIA was extremely generous in its expansion of 
the Canadian Indian section of U.S. immigration law, making non-
Indian spouses of Indians effectively Indians entitled to all of the 
benefits of the Jay Treaty and subsequent law,64 there is also an under-
lying basis to Matter of S- that can been interpreted in one of two 
fashions: first, that the BIA was giving broad treatment to the concept 
of comity with Canadian law, almost to the point of allowing Canada 
to determine who could enter the U.S.;65 or, second, in its discussion 
of "ancient tribal rights," the BIA granted broad deference to Indian 
tribes to determine their own membership (through cultural preroga-
tives).66 This latter approach would be almost a completely opposite 
approach than the federal government takes for its own u.s. Indians, 
whose membership and qualifications are determined by a quagmire 
61 Id. at 312. 
62Id. 
63 Id. As previously mentioned, the BIA, just a few short years later, reversed this posi-
tion, and made the determination that a Canadian Indian woman in such a position would 
not surrender her passage rights, as she was still ethnologically an Indian. See Matter of 8-, 
31. & N. Dec. at 192. 
64 It is important to note, however, that this anomalous result has since been rectified 
in the C.F.R: 
[t]he term "American Indian born in Canada" as used in section 289 of the 
Act includes only persons possessing 50 per centum or more of the blood of 
the American Indian race. It does not include a person who is the spouse or 
child or such an Indian or a person whose membership ill an Indian tribe or 
family is created by adoption, unless such person possesses at least 50 per cen-
tum or more of such blood. 
8 C.F.R § 289.1. While the C.F.R has specifically enumerated which family members are 
not entitled to Section 289 rights, it is significant to note that the U.S. INA has a somewhat 
broader definition of "child," more closely resembling the Revised Statutes of Canada 
[hereinafter RS.C.] section than the C.F.R INA § 101 (b) (1). 
65 See Matter ofS--, 31. & N. Dec. at 312. 
66 See id. 
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of tribe recogmtIOn, membership rolls, census numbers, and blood 
quantum requirements.67 
In In the Matter of A-, the BIA addressed the issue of a Canadian 
Indian charged for deportation on several counts, including becom-
ing a public charge and being infected by a contagious disease.68 In 
this case, it is important to note that the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) only sought removal of the Canadian Indian for 
the deportation charge arising after entry, thereby acknowledging 
implicitly that Canadian Indians are not excludable at entry.69 
The issue in Matter of A-, then, turned on whether Canadian 
Indians can be deported following entry.70 The Board acknowledged 
that Canadian Indians are not inadmissible; the only option to keep 
them out of the United States would be through deportation for is-
sues arising after entry.71 The Board discussed the consequences of 
such a deportation.72 The court found that the Indian-defendant had 
become a public charge within five years of entry; additionally, the 
court found that he had no family ties within the U.S., no fixed domi-
cile, and he had been arrested for drunkenness in the United States 
and Canada.73 For these grounds, the BIA found that "we do not feel 
that the alien is a particularly desirable person [and there] are no 
compelling reasons why he should be permitted to remain in this 
country. "74 As the BIA explained in a later case, the Board was refus-
ing to "extend the immunity from exclusion to deportation. "75 
One of the more pivotal cases in terms of defining language in 
the variable forms of the Jay Treaty was decided by the BIA in 1948.76 
In the Matter of B- addressed the somewhat sensitive issue of what ex-
actly are "American Indians born in Canada. "77 In this case, an 
Abenaki woman married a white Canadian, and the white husband 
subsequently was naturalized as a United States citizen.78 The woman 
later was convicted of adultery in Vermont in 1935.79 Her entry was 
67 See COHEN, supra note 56, at 19-27. 
68 In the Matter of A-,ll. & N. 600, 604 (BIA 1943). 




73 Matter of A-,ll. & N. Dec. at 604-05. 
74 Id. at 605. 
75 Matter of Yellow quill, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 577. 
76 See Matter of 8-,3 I. & N. Dec. 191. 
77 Id. at 192. 
78Id. at 191. 
79 !d. at 191-92. 
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denied, and she challenged the action.80 The BIA's main task was to 
decide whether she had lost her status as a "North American Indian" 
under Canadian law by virtue of her marriage to a white man.81 If the 
BIA so concluded, it would have subjected her to the general immi-
gration laws and prevented her from enjoying the benefits of the Jay 
Treaty free passage right.82 Although the BIA had previously adopted 
the political, and not the ethnological, identity approach, the then-
recent Goodwin decision led the BIA to restate and implicitly concur 
with the Goodwin principle that the wording within the Jay Treaty 
"must be given a racial and not a political connotation," and thereby 
reject the Canadian statutory revocation of the applicant's status as an 
Indian.83 But the BIA did indicate that an offense that would not ad-
versely affect admissibility might be used as grounds for deportation.84 
Matter of B- presents an interesting departure from the principle 
of comity, as well as traditional federal Indian law: a member of a non-
federally recognized tribe (and therefore not an "Indian" in the eyes 
of the U.S. government), and also a member of a Canadian tribe who 
had lost Indian status (and therefore not an "Indian" in the eyes of 
the Canadian government), still would, under the Jay Treaty, enjoy 
full treaty-crossing rights.85 In short, an Indian not recognized as an 
"Indian" in Canada or the u.S. would nonetheless be non-removable 
in the U.S. were he to commit an otherwise deportable offense (thus 
enjoying the same rights as a recognized Canadian Indian), because 
the Board shifted the focus to racial, not political, identity in Matter of 
B_.86 
The BIA also has ruled on the difference between treatment of 
Canadian Indians under exclusion standards and under deportation 
standards.87 In In the Matter of D-, a Canadian Indian was charged 
with entry less than one year after deportation, and having been de-
ported for conviction of grand larceny (two separate offenses).88 The 
BIA reaffirmed its prior holding that "in these North American Cana-
dian Indian cases, a ground of inadmissibility existing at the time of 
80 Id. at 192. 
81 Matter of 8--, 3 I.&.N. Dec. at 191. 
82Id. at 192. 
83 Id.; see United States ex reI. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp.66O, 663 (W.D.N.Y. 
1947). 
84 Matter of 8--, 3 I. & N. Dec. at 192. 
85 See id. at 191-92. 
86 Id. at 192. 
87 In the Matter ofD-, 31. & N. Dec. 300,301 (BIA 1948). 
88 Id. 
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entry does not constitute a cause for deportation. "89 The BIA further 
held that, while offenses after entry could result in deportation,90 in 
this case, any action taken against this particular individual would be 
only that of a belated exclusion action, prohibited under BIA and 
federal case law.91 
In Matter of Yellowquill, the BIA revisited the issue of distinguish-
ing exclusion and deportation in a later case regarding a Canadian 
Indian arrested in Texas for heroin possession, a deportable offense.92 
The Board consulted with INS General Counsel, who indicated that 
the Saxbe decision was correct and that the Matter of A- decision 
should be explicitly overruled.93 The BIA concurred, then briefly re-
stated the principles underlying Saxbe, overruled Matter of A-, and 
terminated deportation proceedings.94 This case seems to be the 
"highwater mark" for the liberal interpretation of Section 289; in this 
particular instance, the INS actually argued before the BIA that it did 
not have the authority to deport someone for heroin possession.95 
3. U.S. Government Definition of an "Indian" 
There is no single definition of "Indian" under U.S. federal law 
to aid in the evaluation of Section 289. The definition usually is pro-
vided within the specific statute passed, or can be predicated on tribal 
status, also a confusing area of law.96 To put it simply, a tribe is what-
ever Congress calls it; even if a "tribe" includes groups that do not 
speak the same language,97 includes groups that formally had no 
structured political or social association with one another,98 or even if 
the "tribe" is only a smaller portion of a larger political unit divided by 
89 Id. at 303. 
90 Id. (while further noting that "even though such action will not have the effect of 
preventing such a person from recrossing into the United States"). 
91Id. 
92 Matter of Yellow quill, 161. & N. Dec. at 576. 
93 Id. at 578. 
94Id. 
95 See id. 
96 See COHEN, supra note 56, at 19-27. Also complicating matters is the unique status of 
classifications held by Pueblo Indians, Alaskan natives, and native Hawaiians. Id. at 739 et 
seq. 
97 For example, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, which includes Cherokees, Dela-
wares, and Shawnees. Id. at 6. 
98 Such as Pacific coast tribes, as discussed in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191 (1978). Id. at 6 n.22. 
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the U.S. government.99 And, of course, most crucial to the definition 
of "tribe" is that the federal government has recognized the group in 
some fashion, be it through treaties, agreements, statutes, or through 
an ongoing relationship.lOo 
Congress typically treats Indian status, relating to individuals, not 
as a separate concept, but instead identifies such individuals as a de-
rivative of their tribe's status. WI There is no simple definition of "In-
dian" based on ethnological or political status; in some cases, a "full-
blooded" Indian, by virtue of belonging to a non-recognized tribe, is 
not an "Indian" under federal definitions. lo2 However, U.S. common 
law sometimes has recognized an individual as an Indian where his 
ancestors inhabited the U.S. before the arrival of Europeans, and 
where the individual enjoys recognition by his tribe as an Indian. lo3 
Courts and Congress generally have been deferential to tribes to de-
termine who may, and who may not, hold membership status in a 
tribe. lo4 However, when administration of federal laws is at issue, Con-
gress often will formulate a definition of "Indian," usually specific to 
the statute being passed.105 Sometimes the statute requires a blood 
quantum minimum, or status within a recognized tribe.106 It is also 
relevant, and interesting, to note that Canadian Indian statutes do not 
impose any blood quantum requirements. I07 
In the United States, the language in Section 289 is "American 
Indian born in Canada," and not "Canadian Indian;" if a political ba-
sis was intended by Congress, there certainly have been decades of 
opportunities to amend the language to make it clearer. lOS Congress, 
99 Most notably, the Sioux, who were divided into seven different groups by Congress. 
Id. at 6 n.25. 
100 Id. at 6-7. 
101 See COHEN, supra note 56, at 19. 
102 Id. Similarly, an individual holding 25% Indian blood and 75% Caucasian blood, 
while being ethnologically Caucasian, might be recognized as an "Indian" for some federal 
necessities. Id. 
103Id. at 19-20 n.4. However, Congress has also recognized tribes that have migrated 
into the United States. 25 U.S.C. § 495 (establishing a reservation for the in-migrating 
Metlakatla Indians). 
104 COHEN, supra note 56, at 20-21. 
105Id. at 23-27. 
106 Id. at 24. Sometimes this has required tribes to establish tribal membership rolls: 
exclusion from the rolls means exclusion from federal recognition. Id. at 25. 
107 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 5-17. 
108 See 8 U.S.C. § 1359; 8 C.F.R. 289.1 et seq. 
2001] Native American Free Passage Rights 327 
the courts, and the BIA essentially have deferred determination of 
"Indian" to the Canadian governmen t. 109 
B. Canadian Courts 
Unlike the U.S., Canada has not codified the Jay Treaty.110 The 
closest relevant Canadian immigration statute is as brief as its sister 
statute in the United States, Section 289: "A person who is registered 
as an Indian pursuant to the Indian Act has, whether or not that per-
son is a Canadian citizen, the same rights and obligations under this 
Act as a Canadian citizen."lll At least on its face, this statute perhaps 
may be construed more broadly than Section 289.112 The statute 
clearly indicates that an Indian only needs to be registered with the 
Canadian authorities to be entitled to the full rights of Canadian citi-
zens.113 The Indian need not be a citizen of Canada to enjoy Canadian 
rights, such as the right of entry and the right to remain. 114 
However, the statute does not specifically speak to the Jay 
Treaty.115 Canadian courts readily reject the Jay Treaty free passage of 
goods right,1l6 but have interpreted the free movement concept in a 
somewhat erratic light, sometimes narrowing interpretation of the 
free passage right to almost non-existence. ll7 
109 See Matter ofS-, 11.&.N. Dec. at 312; but see 8 C.F.R. 289.1 (eliminating granting of 
free passage rights for persons not meeting blood quantum requirement). Although mar-
riage and adoption loopholes have been closed, the exact definition of "American Indian" 
remains undefined, apparently still deferred to the Canadian government. 8 C.F.R. 289.1. 
But see United States v. Curnew, 788 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing cultural an-
thropologist to testifY as expert regarding pI'esence of American Indian blood in person 
claiming Jay Treaty rights). For example, U.S. regulations apparently would permit the 
free passage right being granted to a Mayan adopted by a Mohawk family. Id. 
110 Francis I, 1954 DLR LEXIS 767 at *17; see KelTY Wilkins, "Still Crazy After All These 
Yean": Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty, 38 ALBERTA L. RE\'. 458, 473-74 (2000). 
III R.S.c. 1985, c. 1-2, S. 4(3). 
112 See id. 
113 /d. 
114 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, S. 4. 
115 Seeid. at S. 4(3). 
116 See Francis I, 1954 DLR LEXIS 767 at *42. 
117 See infra notes 118-159 and accompanying text. However, Canadian courts have 
cushioned this, as demonstrated in Liebelt: "This does not mean, of course, that proper 
control of the border may not be a justification for Canada to control or limit in some way 
the exercise of relevant and unextinguished Abol'iginal rights." 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at 
*25. 
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At least one Canadian court has presented several alternative in-
terpretations of the Canadian implementation of the Jay Treaty.llS 
The Regina v. Vincent case concerned a member of the Lorette Huron 
band who attempted to transport several hundred dollars worth of 
tobacco into Canada free of duty.1l9 Instead of asserting that the Jay 
Treaty had been abrogated by the War of 1812, the Ontario Court of 
Appeals instead examined the issue under the language of the Jay 
Treaty.120 Thus, contrasting the language "their own goods and ef-
fects" (items protected by the Jay Treaty from tariffs) and "goods in 
bales or other large packages unusual among Indians" (items not pro-
tected), the court found that the seven large cardboard boxes within 
which the Huron band member had transported the tobacco were not 
protected; therefore, the tobacco contained therein was not ex-
empted from duty.121 The decision of the court was predicated on the 
idea of fair commercial competition between Indians and U.S./Can-
adian citizens, as well as the fact that the Indians did not enjoy the 
right of transporting duty-free commercial items across the U.S.-
Canadian border at the time of the signing of the Jay Treaty.122 How-
ever, the recognition of the court that the right of free passage of 
goods by native groups still exists under a Jay Treaty analysis is a fur-
ther demonstration of the liberal treatment of the rights enumerated 
in the Jay Treaty.123 
Perhaps even more significantly, the Vincent court found that the 
Jay Treaty conferred no individual rights on members of any Cana-
dian tribe, as the treaty never had been enacted into legislation by the 
Canadian government.124 The court took pains to distinguish U.S. 
treatment of the treaty, pointing out that the nature of the U.S. Con-
stitution, and Senate approval of treaties, made treaties signed by the 
U.S. self-executing in nature.125 The court pointed out that under the 
law of Canada and the United Kingdom, ratification of a treaty is a 
function of the executive branch.126 The court, based on language 
from a British House of Lords decision, concluded that international 
118 Regina v. Vincent, 11 T.T.R. 210 (Ont. Ct. App. 1993), available at 1993 TTR LEXIS 
7, at *13-32. 
119 [d. at *6-7. 
120 [d. at *11. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
123 See Vincent, 1993 TTR LEXIS 7, at *11. 
124 [d. at *24-25. 
125 [d. at *23-24. 
126 [d. at *24. 
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treaties, having no portion thereof incorporated into legislation, were 
not justiciable.127 While the court was deciding the relatively narrow 
question of whether commercial goods could be duty-free if trans-
ported by native groups, the implications of such a finding relating to 
the Jay Treaty potentially affect the free passage rights.128 
Another case of narrow interpretation from the Canadian courts 
is that of Minister of National Revenue v. Mitchell.1 29 In this case, a mem-
ber of the Mohawk Nation attempted entrance into British Columbia, 
carrying a number of goods, only one intended for commercial re-
sale; the Mohawk tribal member claimed immunity from duties, per 
the provisions of the Jay Treaty.130 The court criticized the lower court 
for vesting the Mohawk tribal member with an "international mobility 
right," including the right of free passage of goods without restric-
tion.13l The court reasoned that such a right had expanded well be-
yond the Customs Act that the lower court originally had been called 
upon to interpret; instead, such an "international mobility right" also 
had implications for the Immigration Act, the Citizenship Act, and 
the Extradition ACt. 132 The court retreated to an assertion of Cana-
dian state sovereignty: "an aboriginal right to enter a sovereign state 
that is not based on citizenship of that state cannot be reconciled with 
that state's right to self-preservation by effecting an appropriate con-
trol of its borders. "133 Instead, the court opted to view the right as an 
aboriginal right, restricted, through historical evidence, by a discern-
able geographical scope.134 The court concluded that the evidence 
presented by the Mohawk tribal member "whether it is in the form of 
oral history, expert or documentary evidence of past practices cus-
toms and traditions, does not support the existence nor warrant the 
granting of an aboriginal right free of clear specific geographicallimi-
tations. "135 The court found that the free passage right given was simi-
lar to hunting and fishing rights that native groups still could exer-
cise-that such rights are site-specific and do not create a general 
127 [d. at *26-30. Note that this principle, as I'elating to the Jay Treaty, was also enunci-
ated in the Hands [decision. 4 D.L.R. LEXIS 767, at *12-13. 
128 Vincent, 1993 TTR LEXIS 7, at *25-30. 
129 See Minister of National Revenue v. Mitchell, 1998 Fed. Ct. Appeal LEXIS 345, at 
*22 (Fed. Ct. App. 1998). 
130 [d. at *14-15. 
131 [d. at *17. 
132 [d. at *17-18. 
133 [d. at *19. 
134 Mitchi'll, 1998 Fed. Ct. Appeal LEXIS 345, at *20. 
135 [d. at *20. 
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right exercisable everywhere.136 Thus, the court held that the free pas-
sage of goods right claimed by the Mohawk only extended to those 
goods bought in New York State.137 Similarly, the court held that Mo-
hawk goods used for non-commercial uses (here, trading) would be 
limited only to those groups they were historically trading partners 
with the Mohawk.138 Although not explicitly stated, the court's test of 
"practices and traditions or the terms of the Jay Treaty which is said to 
embody such practices and traditions" would seem to extend also to 
court review of free passage rights claimed by a member of a native 
group. 139 
Perhaps the most definitive case from the Canadian courts re-
garding interpretation of the Jay Treaty free passage right is Watt v. 
Liebelt.I40 In this case, a member of the Colville tribe from the State of 
Washington,141 and a U.S. citizen, was convicted in Canada for grow-
ing marijuana.I42 Like U.S. immigration law, such a conviction poten-
tially places a person in danger of deportation, and the Colville mem-
ber was brought before an immigration adjudicator for a 
determination of deportability.143 Complicating the matter was the 
fact that the Colville tribal member claimed to be a member of the 
Arrow Lakes band; the court noted that the Arrow Lakes band had 
been a group assigned a reserve in Canada in 1902, but, with the 
death of the last Canadian member in 1953, the group was declared 
extinct and the reserve reverted to the Crown.l44 The question before 
the court was whether a non-Canadian, non-registered Indian claim-
ing an aboriginal right to remain in Canada would be allowed to do 
SO.145 The court considered this question in light of the language of 
Chapter 1-2 of the Revised Statutes of Canada (R.S.C.) and also con-
sidered whether the passage of this section of the Immigration Act 
extinguished aboriginal rights to free passage.I46 The court held that, 
136 Id. at *22. 
137Id. 
138 Id. at *23. 
139 See Mitchell, 1998 Fed. Ct. Appeal LEXIS 345, at *24. 
140 Watt v. Liebelt, 65 C.R.R.2d 191 (Fed. Ct. App. 1998), available at 1998 CRR LEXIS 
458. 
141 As previously noted, the Colville tribe is known in Canada as the Okanogan; this 
group is bisected by the U.S.-Canadian border. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
142 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *9. 
143Id. at *9-10; see Matter of Yellow quill, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 576 (for a somewhat faCtli-
ally analogous U.S. case involving possession of heroin). 
144 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *10-11. 
145Id. at *18. 
146Id. at *19-20. 
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by the exact wording of the Immigration Act, the defendant had no 
right to remain in Canada, as he was neither a Canadian citizen nor a 
registered Indian.147 However, as this finding implicated the extin-
guishing of a aboriginal right, the court was bound to consider 
whether the legislature or government had demonstrated a "clear and 
plain intention" to extinguish such a right.148 While holding that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish such a right, the court also 
held that insufficient evidence had been presented to establish such a 
"clear and plain intention" by the legislature.149 In remanding the 
case for further factual determinations, the court left open the possi-
bility that a u.s. Native American citizen could claim the aboriginal 
right of free passage, given that the claimant could prove a "nexus" 
relationship to Canada in some sort of historical or contemporary cul-
tural fashion.150 
Herein lies the crux of the disparity arising between U.S. and 
Canadian treatment of the Jay Treaty free passage right: whereas the 
Canadian common law has restricted the free passage right only to 
those members of tribes that can demonstrate a "nexus" relationship 
with Canadian land, U.S. statute grants the right essentially without 
limitation.151 Thus, U.S. immigration authorities are bound by law to 
admit any Canadian-born Indian, apparently regardless of where in 
Canada the tribal group is located; conversely, Canadian courts re-
strict the right of entry by U.S. Indians to those groups that can dem-
onstrate a historical right and practice to do so, thereby implicitly ex-
cluding vast numbers of U.S. Indians whose tribes were not 
traditionally located near the present U.S-Canadian border.152 
147 Id. at *20. 
148 Id. at *20-21. 
149 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *23. 
150 Id. at *25-27. 
151 Compare id. with 8 U.S.C. § 1359; note, additionally, that state courts have generally 
given a lot of deference to the free passage right and related federal rulings. See, e.g., State 
v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 281 (Wash. App. 2001) (holding that Jay Tl·eaty rights creates a 
means for Canadian Indians to claim federal Indian status for purposes of establishing 
criminal court jurisdiction); In re LindaJ.W., 179 Misc. 2d 96 (N.¥. Fam. Ct. 1998) (in 
determining right of Canadian Indian to adoption information under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 'The border which separates Canada from the United States ... has been 
subsequently adopted and ratified by the United States and Canada. The existence of this 
border has no effect on the community of tlle Six Nations .... This continuity of me Six 
Nations community is recognized by the United States and Canada in the right of free and 
uninhibited passage of people and goods across the United States/Canada border which is 
granted to the Six Nations under the Jay Treaty."). 
152 Compare Liebelt, 1988 CRR LEXIS 458, at *23, with 8 U.S.C. § 1359. 
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Although the C.F.R. does not address the specific entry proce-
dure,153 the Canadian government explains the entry procedure into 
the United States in a Frequently Asked Questions memorandum dis-
tributed by the relevant governmental agency, the Department of In-
dian Mfairs and Northern Development (DIAND): "[Registered Indi-
ans] must present an identification card (Indian status card) at the 
border crossing. If they do not have a card, a written statement from 
the band council is required along with other documentation which 
proves possession of lineage derived from at least 50 per cent North 
American Indian people."154 Under Canadian law, an individual is 
"registered" if his name is contained in the national Indian Register.155 
An application for registration is made to the government, and the 
Registrar may make the addition-one aspect of eligibility is member-
ship in a recognized band.156 Bands are statutorily empowered to 
make their own determinations of membership,157 which makes status 
as an Indian under Canadian law a band decision, if the band so 
chooses to assume the responsibility. Ultimately, the result is that Sec-
tion 289 rights are granted to anyone with "card-carrying" status as a 
Canadian Indian.158 For those Indians who are not registered, access 
still is granted with a letter from the band council confirming mem-
bership, as well as some sort of documentation demonstrating 50% 
Indian blood.159 
153 See 8 C.F.R. § 289.1 et seq. 
154 Frequently Asked Questions About Aboriginal Peoples, at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ 
pr /info/info1l6_e.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2001). 
155 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 5 (1). 
156 Id. at s. 6-1 (b). 
157 Id. at s. 1O( 1). 
158 The number of registered Indians listed in the Indian Register in Canada stood at 
511,791 as of December 31, 1991. 1991 Census Highlights on Registered Indians, at ix (Oct. 
1995), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr /sfs/ cen/ erihl_e.pdf [hereinafter Census 
Highlights]. This number is projected to exceed 790,000 by 2008. Population Projections of 
Registered Indians-1998-2008 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nr/ 
nwltr/sfs/ffs_e.html. Of course, every single one of these registered Indians is entitled, 
under U.S. law, to the equivalent of Lawful Permanent Resident status by simply showing a 
status card at the U.S. border. 8 C.F.R. § 289.2. 
159 General Information, supra note 154. The number of registered Indians in Canada ac-
tually only comprises 38% of the aboriginal population, as the Inuit and Metis groups (as 
well as Indians who simply did not register) a1'e not included for registration purposes. 
Census Highlights, supra note 158, at 3. The actual number of persons with Aboriginal ori-
gins in 1991 totaled some 1,016,340 (approximately 6% of the Canadian population), all 
of whom could be eligible for Section 289 benefits provided they met their burden of 
proof at the border. Id. Of course, as Canadian law doesn't establish any per centum blood 
requirements, it is unclear what percentage of these would actually meet the U.S. 50% 
blood quantum requirement. See R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 5-17; 8 U .S.C. § 1359. 
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III. SURVIVAL: WHY? 
A. In the U.S. 
The primary consideration for understanding the survival of the 
Jay Treaty free passage provision is the fact that it remained unchal-
lenged in the courts until well into the twentieth century.l60 By then, 
the Indian Wars were well over, and the status of U.S. Indians was as 
"wards of the nation," standing "separate and apart from the native-
born citizen. "161 Although some of the most difficult times to face U.S. 
Indians were still to come,162 a dramatic shift in general Native Ameri-
can policy was occurring simultaneously in the 1920s, with more cul-
turally sensitive policies by the Bureau of Indian Mfairs, and a more 
protective, paternalistic approach to Indian peoples as true "wards" of 
the U.S. government.163 These policies were buttressed by the massive 
social policies of the New DeaI.l64 Thus, it would be easy to draw the 
simple conclusion that Section 289 has enjoyed such liberal vitality in 
the United States based on coincidental, beneficial timing. Of course, 
other factors, such as deference to tribal sovereignty165 and long-term 
good relations with Canada,166 undoubtedly aided in the preservation 
of the statute. 
B. In Canada 
The reasons for survival of the Jay Treaty free passage right in 
Canada are likely very similar to that of the United States: relative 
160 Diablo I, 18 F.2d 282. 
161 Diablo II, 25 F.2d at 71. 
162 See generall:y COHEN, supra note 56, at 152-80. Following the end ofWWII, Congress 
decided that several tribes needed "termination" to further the goal of assimilation, result-
ing in the complete dissolution of a reservation, revocation of federal recognition of both 
the tribe and membership therein, and denial of all benefits associated with federal 
status-in 1954 alone, Congress terminated some sixty-seven tribes. Id. at 173-74. The 
Johnson and Nixon administrations aided in reversing this trend, and Congress later re-
stored some of these tribes' status. Id. at 184-87. 
163 Id. at 144-52. 
164Id. 
165 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) ('The Chemkee nation, 
then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory .... "); Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) ("A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil author-
ity over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its resen'ation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tri be.") . 
166 See Alura, 279 U.S. at 242. 
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lateness in addressing the right167 and respect for fundamental rights 
of native groupS.168 It is even more surprising, considering the lack of 
statutory support for the right.l69 Courts in Canada have been forced 
to grapple with a vague "aboriginal rights" standard;170 this standard 
has forced the testing of prehistoric and historic ethnographic pat-
terns, which, of course, may not be settled issues in anthropology and 
archaeology.l7l 
C. Other Free Passage Rights Under U.S. Law 
In at least one instance, there has been a Congressional indica-
tion of intent not only to extend wardship over other Indians within 
U.S. borders, but also to extend the right of free movement to a 
group that traditionally did not inhabit the lands now bifurcated by 
the U.S.-Mexico border.172 Expansion of the liberal "aboriginal right" 
concept to free movement is demonstrated by Congress' treatment of 
the Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians; this group was divided by the 
U.S.-Mexican border, creating essentially a rightless, landless tribe.173 
Although granted a year-to-year parole status by Congress in the 
1950s,174 living conditions of the tribe decreased so dramatically that 
Congress ultimately intervened to offer health and educational assis-
tance in cOI~unction with the Mexican government,l75 Most impor-
tantly, Congress extended the benefits of Section 289 to the band: 
"[n]otwithstanding the Immigration and Nationality Act, all members 
of the Band shall be entitled to freely pass and repass the borders of 
the United States and to live and work in the United States."176 Like 
167 Francis l, 1954 D.L.R. LEXIS 767. 
168 Watt v. Liebelt, 65 C,R.R.2d 191 (Fed. Ct. App. 1998), available at 1998 CRR LEXIS 
458, at *21-22. 
169 Regina v. Vincent, 11 T.T.R. 210 (Ont. Ct. App. 1993), available at 1993 TTR LEXIS 
7, at *23-24. 
170 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *25-27. 
17l Diana Alexander, A Reconstruction of Prehisturic Land Use in the Mid-Fraser River Area 
Based on Ethnographic Data, in A COMPLEX CULTURE OF" THE BRITISH COLUMBIA PLATEAU 
99,101 (1992) (noting that "the record of [Lillooet and Shuswap) traditional subsistence 
and settlement patterns remains incomplete;" and that "until recently, very little was 
known about traditional native use of alpine environments"). 
172 25 U.S.C. § 1300b-11 (passedJan. 8,1983, Pub. L. No. 97-429, sec. 2,96 Stat. 2269) 
(1999) (recognizing the U.S. role in forcing the Kickapoo "to migrate from its ancestral 
lands") . 
173 Austin, supra note 26, at 107-09. 
1i4 Id. at 108. 
175 25 U.S.C. § 1300b-ll; see 25 U.S.C. § 1300b-16(b) (regarding "cooperation with 
[the) Mexican government"). 
176 25 U.S.C. § 1300h-13(d). 
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the C.F.R. relating to Canadian Indians, this language awards the 
band the statutory presumption of lawful permanent resident (LPR) 
status.177 While the Texas Kickapoo are granted free passage rights, 
members of the Tohono O'odham tribe in Arizona are subject to the 
same admission and deportation requirements as Mexican nationals 
simply for travel across their own traditional lands. 178 
Complete discussion of free passage rights for native groups situ-
ated on the U.S.-Mexican border is beyond the scope of this Note. 
However, two excellent articles have been written on the subject, one 
from an aboriginal rights perspective,I79 the other from a human 
rights perspective. I80 
IV. POSSIBLE RECTIFICATIONS OF U.S. AND CANADIAN INTERPRETIVE 
DIFFERENCES 
The need to realign American and Canadian law regarding the 
free passage right under the Jay Treaty is apparent. I8I The law in the 
United States, as buttressed by both statuteI82 and decisions from the 
federal courtsI83 and the immigration administrative body,I84 is fairly 
well established. However, Canadian common law, once fairly gener-
ous in its construction of the Jay Treaty free passage right,I85 now re-
177 25 U.S.C. § 1300b-13c ("Citizenship for applicants. For a period of five years after 
the publication of the Federal Register notice. .. any member of the Band whose name 
appears 011 the mil ... may ... apply for United States citizenship"); sel' 25 U.S.c. 1300b-
1:~(b); 8 C.F.R. § 289.2. 
178 Austin, supra note 26. at 101. 
179 See O'Brien, supra note 17, at 315. 
180 See Austin, supra note 26, at 116. 
181 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1359 with Watt v. Liebelt, 65 C.R.R.2d 191 (Fed. Ct. App. 1998), 
availablR at 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *25-27. 
182 8 U.S.C. § 1359. 
183 Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Stipp. 1210,1220-21 (D. Maine, 1974). 
181 Matter of Yellow quill, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 578. 
185 Regina v. White & Bob, 50 D.L.R. 2d 613, aliailablR at 1964 DLR LEXIS 2235, at *80 
(B.C. Ct. App. 1964). 
[d. 
This is particularly important in the case of Indians, who are inclined to mve, 
a fact which has been accepted by the United States and Canada with refer-
ence to the movements of Indians to and fm acmss the International Bound-
ary. A pmvision to this eHect was included in the Jay Treaty of 1794 between 
Great Britain and the United States and confirmed by the Treaty of Ghent in 
1814. 
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quires a rather strict "nexus" test,186 rejecting any sort of "interna-
tional mobility right" claimed by an applicant Indian.187 
Resolution of this dilemma will likely not arise from analysis and 
construction of the Jay Treaty, as U.S. courts have held that the Jay 
Treaty has been abrogated.188 Abrogation issues aside, the Jay Treaty 
also does not have a single Indian signatory.l89 As the Canadian court 
decision in Vincent noted, non-signatories to a treaty cannot claim 
protected privileges under that treaty.190 Similarly, passage of a new 
treaty would be all but impossible-Canadian law will not afford free 
passage rights unless the Indians are signatories,191 and the U.S. Con-
gress forbade treaty-making with Indian Nations some 130 years 
ago.192 
Perhaps the most logical solution is for Canada to pass a statute 
similar to that of Section 289 of the INA.l93 A broadly-written statute, 
accompanied by similar regulatory provisions, perhaps would allow at 
least facial equality in the laws between the U.S. and Canada.l94 
Treatment of the statute in the Canadian courts, of course, would not 
necessarily be a mirror image of U.S. law, but it at least would put a 
halt to the ever-increasing restrictiveness of the common law "nexus" 
test that the Canadian courts have formulated. 195 As in the United 
186 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *25-27. 
187 Minister of National Revenue v. Mitchell, 1998 Fed. Ct. Appeal LEXIS 345, at *17 
(Fed. Ct. App. 1998). 
188 Albro, 279 U.S at 237 (held that "treaties of amity, of alliance, and the like, having a 
political character ... are generally regarded as belonging to the class of treaty stipulations 
that are absolutely annulled by war."). The Canadian Supreme Court has refused to rule 
on the issue of abrogation, as no enacting legislation exists. Francis II, 1956 DLR LEXIS 
1735, at *7 (held that "it is unnecessary to consider the question whether the terms of the 
Jay Treaty were abrogated by the war of 1812"). 
189 SeeJay Treaty, supra note 1. 
190 Regina v. Vincent, 11 T.T.R. 210 (Ont. Ct. App. 1993), available at 1993 TTR LEXIS 
7, at *20-21. 
191Id. 
192 COHEN, supra note 56, at 107. 
193 8 U.S.C. § 1359. 
194 See id.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 289.1 et seq. 
195 See Watt v. Liebelt, 65 C.R.R.2d 191 (Fed. Ct. App. 1998), availablii at 1998 CRR 
LEXIS 458, at *25-27. However, at least one court in Canada has attempted to add some 
degree of flexibility to the "nexus" test-although requiring that the identified practice, 
custom, or tradition preexist European contact, the court did state that: 'This concept 
gives rise to the proposition that aboriginal rights must be interpreted flexibly so as to 
permit their evolution over time. A modern exercise of a pre-<:ontact practice custom 01' 
tradition should be recognized. This results in the avoidance of a 'frozen rights' ap-
proach." Regina v. Frank, 1999 All. D. Crim.]. LEXIS 216, *17 (Alt. Provo Ct. 1999). 
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States,196 courts in Canada require a "clear and plain" showing of leg-
islative intent before the rights of Indians will be considered restricted 
or eliminated.197 
Continued vitality of the Jay Treaty free passage right might best 
serve as an experiment in the effects of free movement of persons 
and of goods in Canada and the U.S., helping to provide a basis for 
expansion of the provisions relating to immigration in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) treaty.19B Although full 
discussion of the various NAFTA provisions relating to movement of 
citizens between the three signatory nations is well beyond the scope 
of this Note,l99 an important aside is that although NAFTA does not 
provide relaxed movement of persons with immigrant intent,200 Sec-
tion 289 and the C.F.R. dO.201 Thus, the survival of Jay Treaty free pas-
sage rights might provide additional testing for immigrant-intent 
travel between the U.S. and Canada.202 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate fate of the Jay Treaty, the Treaty of Ghent, and re-
lated legislation seems to be of some dispute, and both U.S. and Ca-
nadian courts are unsure how to treat it. Although the U.S. survival of 
the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent have been thrown into serious 
doubt by the Supreme Court's holding in Albro, the fact remains that 
Congress has codified the Jay Treaty provision into U.S. immigration 
law as Section 289 of the INA, and the statute has remained virtually 
unchanged, despite crisis-level periods such as the Termination Era of 
the 1950s. However, the Canadian system never codified the Jay Treaty 
free movement provision, leaving Canadian courts struggling over the 
last fifty years with the vague, unmanageable "aboriginal rights" stan-
dard at common law. Such a standard has resulted in an excessively 
restrictive "nexus" test, especially in the last ten years, requiring the 
presentation and "trying" of anthropological and cultural data. The 
196 COHEN, supra note 56, at 283 ('These rules [of construction] require that congres-
sional intent to override particular Indian rights be clear."). 
197 Liebelt, 1998 CRR LEXIS 458, at *20. 
198 For general discussion ofNAFfA and immigration, see generally LEGOMSKY, supra 
note 25, at 216-17,249. 
199 Indeed, at least one author of an immigration law text has found the topic of non-
immigrant provisions within NAFfA too expansive for any inclusion beyond passing dis-
cussion. Id. at 249. 
200Id. at 216. 
201 8 U.S.C. § 1359; 8 C.F.R. § 289.2. 
202 See 8 C.F.R. § 289.2; LEGOMSKY, supra note 25, at 216. 
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restrictive Canadian treatment, balanced against the liberal American 
treatment, potentially exposes interested individuals (members of na-
tive groups attempting to cross the U.S-Canadian border) to wild dis-
parities in the law. Movement into the U.S. is highly deferential, and 
Indians enjoy great respect for prehistoric rights; however, movement 
into Canada essentially places the Indian individual on the same level 
as any other entering alien, despite his group's occupation of the 
same borderlands for thousands of years preceding Great Britain's 
establishment of the Canadian territories. 
In fact, despite the various legal conflicts and questions that have 
arisen around the language, Congress has done virtually nothing to 
restrict or narrow 8 U.S.C. sec. 1359, leaving courts to broadly inter-
pret the statute; similarly, some of the broadest interpretations of Sec-
tion 289 can be found within the related federal regulations. 203 Where 
some courts promptly dispense with the Jay Treaty (and the Treaty of 
Ghent) on the question of free passage of goods, other courts hedge 
the language in the Jay Treaty and subsequent law as merely stating a 
"natural law" sort of concept for free passage of individuals, a right 
enjoyed by Indians that preceded European arrival to the New World. 
It is curious that such a right survives to this day on both the U.S. 
and Canadian sides of the border. This is especially true given the 
difficulties each nation has experienced in dealing both with immi-
gration and Indian law. In the U.S. alone, these areas of law have un-
dergone dramatic changes in policy in the approximately 200 years of 
independence. Immigration and Indian legislation in the United 
States is especially notable for periods of blatant racism, but through 
all of this, the policy of free movement of Canadian Indians has sur-
vived. The fact that 2% of the Canadian populous is eligible for LPR 
benefits, without ever having to fill out a U.S. immigration form, is 
tribute to the expansiveness and curiosity of the American statutory 
enactment of the Jay Treaty. 
However, given the restrictiveness of the Canadian common law 
treatment of the Jay Treaty free passage right, it is clear that U.S. and 
Canadian laws will have to be rectified. If tribal sovereignty is to mean 
anything, it must at least mean that members of the sovereign are 
empowered to travel within and through their traditional lands with-
203 See 8 C.F.R. § 289.2 (creating lawful permanent resident rights for American Indi-
ans born in Canada); see also 22 C.F.R. § 42.1 (f) ("An immigrant within any of the follow-
ing categories is not required to obtain an immigrant visa ... (f) American Indians born in 
Canada. An American Indian born in Canada and having at least 50 per centum of blood 
of the American Indian race"). 
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out interference from other sovereigns. The realignment of U.S. and 
Canadian treatment of the Indian free passage right needs to occur in 
order to preserve a right not only guaranteed in the post-
Revolutionary War Jay Treaty, but also a right, by the Canadian courts' 
own admission, that is older than European occupation of North 
America. 
